Introduction
It is one of the less exciting insights of political science that institutional and political fragmentation make swift and coherent economic decision-making difficult (Chibber, 2002 (Chibber, , 2004 Haggard/Kaufman, 1995; Tsebelis, 2002) . While the present article generally agrees with this finding, it proposes one important, yet overlooked exception to this rule: When external pressure is applied on a polity, internal fragmentation can in fact dramatically accelerate change.
The case on which the argument is developed is Saudi Arabia's accession to the WTO, which represents a particularly clean instance of this mechanism. Saudi Arabia is a paradigmatic capital-and resource-rich "rentier state" (Crystal, 1995; Karl, 1997; Luciani, 1990 ). As such, it is, on the one hand, strongly dependent on one resource and suffers from a number of administrative and institutional deficiencies (Chaudhry, 1997; Vandewalle, 1998) .
These include a rather incoherent bureaucracy with limited regulatory powers as well as weak interest group structures in society. On the other hand however, and different from other developing countries, Saudi Arabia enjoys a high degree of economic sovereignty due to its independence from international lenders and strong position towards trade partners. This means that Saudi economic policies have generally been negotiated in its domestic arena. It was only in the course of Saudi Arabia's negotiations for WTO accession after the mid-1990s that international actors could make direct demands of economic reform towards the Saudi government. And indeed, in the course of post-9/11 skepticism towards all things Saudi, the US as main negotiation partner has exerted unprecedented pressure. This makes for a particularly sharply contrasted comparison of the interaction of domestic reform interests and international conditionality at one instance with mostly domestic negotiations of the same policy issues at previous instances.
I intend to show how specific state structures and state-business relations can have very different outcomes depending on whether international pressure is applied. The argument runs roughly as follows: Historically grown patterns of internal fragmentation in both public and private sector have held up various WTO-related economic reforms in Saudi Arabia as 1 Cited in Montagu 2001, p. 48. long as they were negotiated within the disjointed Saudi system, as there were no institutional capacities and no political space for the domestic negotiation of a WTO bargain. Due to the institutional specifics of the kingdom, more than due to "objective" interests of comparative advantage, no strong pro-WTO coalition emerged.
However, after membership application and a number of reform initiatives had lingered for several years, the Saudi leadership realized that US conditions in the membership negotiations would only become harsher. US intransigence played a significant role in enabling a number of reforms which were rammed through in a top-down fashion by the leadership. Institutional fragmentation of interests again played its role, this time preventing an encompassing veto coalition against a comprehensive policy package which was in its substance imposed from outside. WTO conditionality has allowed the locking-in of reforms.
Fragmentation of state, business and relations between them can hence mean policy stalemate, but can also make for rapid policy adjustment under conditions of external pressure.
Theory and structure of the article
In its analysis of the interplay between international and domestic policy bargaining, the article aims to contribute to existing debates on trade policy and two-level negotiations. There are two theoretical traditions which deal with the domestic aspects of international trade policy and the "distributional coalitions" involved: "reductionist" economic theories and more context-sensitive institutionalist approaches. The economic theories attempt to explain trade policy interests referring to either comparative advantages of specific factors or specific sectors of production (Mayer, 1984; Rogowski, 1989; Frieden/Rogowski, 1996; Rodrik, 1995) .
Following the Stolper-Samuelson theorem of trade theory, the factor-based models analyze the relative scarcity and abundance of factors of production (usually labor, land, and capital) in a given national economy relative to the global economy. The factors which are relatively abundant on the national level will have an interest in trade liberalization, as their price will increase with growing integration into international markets. The reverse applies to domestically scarce factors. Sector-based, or Ricardo-Viner models, by contrast, make the assumption that not all factors are perfectly mobile in the short run, which means that their returns can vary by sector. Immobile factors in import-competing sectors will have an interesting in protection, while those in export-competing sectors will seek free trade. The predictions of the two models are factor-and sector-based trade lobbying, respectively.
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Institutional approaches do not necessarily contradict the predictions which economic approaches make on individual interests, but argue that trade policy outcomes cannot be understood without an analysis of interest-aggregation and decision-making mechanisms (Alt/Gilligan, 1994; Goldstein, 1988; Gourevitch, 1986; Haggard/Webb, 1994; Nelson, 1988; O'Halloran/Lohmann, 1994) . Unfortunately, most institutional approaches focus on institutional mechanisms in Western democracies.
It is the economic approaches which therefore have more predictions to offer on the Saudi case, as they are deductive and general in nature. The article will hence evaluate Saudi policy-making processes and outcomes against what factor-and sector-based models would make us expect. In the resulting critique of economic approaches, I will liberally draw on general insights from the institutionalist literature to show how these might be complemented to cope with non-Western cases like Saudi Arabia.
Going beyond standard assumptions of institutional models, I will emphasize the institutional origins of perceptions and interests.
3 I will moreover discuss the impact of absent domestic interest-aggregation mechanisms on international trade negotiations. In this context, the article will draw on concepts from the literature on state-business relations in developing countries, which has not yet been linked to international political economy debates.
Categories from the state-business relations literature such as associational capacity of business, or trust and reciprocity between state and business can inform institutional analysis of policy-making in non-democratic polities where the Western-oriented institutionalist debate has few specific concepts to contribute (Schneider/Maxfield, 1997; Schneider, 2004; Moore, 2004) . As we will see, these categories can explain policy outcomes and the capacity to reach deals better than deductive economic reasoning can.
The specific innovation of this article lies in discussing the ambiguous effects that institutional fragmentation can have on policy outcomes. What is meant by fragmentation?
For our purposes, it will denote the existence of separate actors within a larger section of the polity (government, private sector) and the incapacity of these to coordinate policies and 2 Depending on how intensely they are involved in production structures of import-and export-competing sectors and what their own consumption patterns are, owners of mobile factors in a Ricardo-Viner world join either protectionist or free-trade sector coalitions -in either case, lobbying stays sector-based (Alt/Gilligan, 1994 Attempting to diversify its industrial base and to create employment to accommodate its youth bulge, the kingdom has had a number of good reasons for joining the WTO. A main motivation is increased legal security and market access for those of its industries which enjoy international comparative advantages (Wilson, 2004: 76ff; Riyadh Bank, 2005) , most prominently energy-and feedstock-intensive sectors like petrochemicals and its associated downstream (Sahlawi; Ramady/Mansour, 2006: 194f.) . Saudi Arabia Basic Industries (SABIC), which is 70 per cent publicly owned and nowadays one of the world's leading petrochemical players, needs free access to international markets and security from antidumping measures. The effect of WTO membership on Saudi growth is expected to be positive (Chemingui/Safadi, 2005) .
Though oil exports still dwarf non-oil exports by a factor of about 8, the latter have increased greatly since the early 1980s. They are more than twice as large than the non-oil exports of any other Arab country, including much more populous Egypt, and are set to increase further (Ramady, 2005: 257f., 276; Wilson, 2004: 81) .
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Saudi Arabia has had an increasing interest in being seen as a serious, credible and accountable international economic player. Since most major economic powers and all GCC states had joined the WTO by 2000, membership became a necessary component of such credibility, 4 and a prerequisite of non-oil diversification (Niblock, 2006: 138; ESCWA, 2001: 62f.; Ramady/Mansour, 2006: 191 (Ramady, 2005: chapter 6) . The Saudi business environment hence makes sunken investment hard to liquidate.
At least in the short-to mid-term, sectoral interests should prevail. We should therefore expect subsidy-dependent Saudi agriculture to be clearly poised against WTO entry, whereas heavy industry -private petrochemicals in particular -should be strongly in favor of accession due to the large capital resources of large Saudi industrialists and the comparative advantage of cheap energy and feedstock. 5 Collective action for the few large heavy industry investors should be easy (Baldwin, 1985: 12ff; Mayer, 1984) . Positions of commercialists and contractors can be expected to be more diffuse, as these are more labor-intensive sectors.
Although expatriate labor in the kingdom is cheap relative to the West, it is expensive relative to some neighboring markets, in which Saudi companies are more likely to compete.
In the less likely case that long-term factor-related interests should prevail, large players in the private sector -who dominate Saudi organized business -should generally be in favor of liberalization thanks to their large capital resources which could be put to good use in heavy industry. 6 Broad-based labor interests are more difficult to deduct. Assuming full factor mobility, one might expect reluctance towards liberalization, as labor in the main competing markets in the Middle East and Asia tends to be even more abundant than in the kingdom.
Domestic Saudi interests: the state
The kingdom would have quite probably found it very easy to join the GATT in the 1980s, 7 when its economy was less open, but the US was much more easy-going on membership and
Saudi Arabia was perceived as full ally in the Cold War (Hoekman/Kostecki, 2001: 67) .
The GATT application was only submitted in 1993, however, and serious negotiations did not start before 1996. At the time, the leadership was moderately optimistic about joining the organization soon. However, the negotiations and the concomitant reforms ran into a number of problems which, as will be argued, primarily reflected the domestic political economy of the kingdom -more than the kingdom's "objective" interests or, at the time, the course of negotiations themselves.
Structure of agencies: fragmented administration
Most of all, the way WTO issues were digested domestically reflected the segmentation of Saudi institutions of government. To understand Saudi policy-making and implementation, it is important to know that Saudi government agencies tend to communicate little among themselves: At the same time as being strongly centralized, ministries and other institutions tend to lead a rather insular existence; horizontal structures of coordination are underdeveloped.
As I have argued elsewhere, the reasons lie in historical patterns of rapid, oil-based state-building since the 1950s. With the growth of national budgets, government institutions expanded rapidly, often under different political patrons and with little need for regulatory coordination, as distribution of oil wealth in one form or another ruled supreme (Hertog, 2005 (Hertog, , 2006b ). Institutions were frequently used as tokens in games of power balance among royals (Herb, 1999) , while an overarching civil service tradition which could have made for coordinated bureaucratic growth was lacking (Awaji, 1971) . Growing oil rents allowed for the sporadic creation of new institutions as reactions to new challenges, without ever leading to the integration of different parts of the bureaucracy. The only common denominator was centralization of ultimate decision-making power in a group of senior royals. A hub-andspoke system of politics emerged, by default rather than by design: organized around the royal family as arch-distributors, and defined by large-scale employment of redundant and often unmotivated staff in a plethora of different institutions, strictly hierarchical and communicating vertically with their royal patrons rather than horizontally with peer institutions (Binsaleh, 1982; Al-Hamoud, 1991) . The large-scale bureaucratic growth and injection of new technocratic talent in the 1970s and early 1980s gave individual institutions and senior commoner administrators more leeway in matters of policy implementation, but changed little about the basically disjointed character of the system (Hertog, 2006b) .
Despite the excellence of individual bits of the bureaucracy, the state machinery has suffered from incoherence and inertia in large areas (Al-Saleh, 1994; Al Saud, 1996; Ammaj, 1990; SAGIA, 2003; Senany, 1990; World Bank, 2002) . The administration is fragmented on the meso-level, the level of individual agencies. This is not despite of, but rather because of the rigid centralization of the system, which undermines horizontal communication and makes for rivalries below the top level -an outcome of institutional history rather than of current, deliberate control tactics by the leadership. 8 As senior royals seldom get involved in minutiae of policy, and rely heavily on technocrats for specific initiatives, fragmentation is the default pattern of policy-making.
In this disjointed system, WTO issues have typically been pursued only by specific players, especially the Ministry of Commerce. Although there is a sizeable bridgehead of Western-educated technocrats with liberal, pro-trade attitudes in the higher echelons of Saudi bureaucracy, this group is not organized as a political force. Many agencies were fully unaware of new WTO-induced requirements for legal and procedural change. Even in cases where communication took place on a senior level, changes in daily administrative practices in principle required for opening the Saudi economy often got unstuck due to lower-level sluggishness and incapacity. Technical expertise required for the nitty-gritty of WTO adaptation was frequently lacking.
As any important decision, the one to go ahead on WTO issues was taken by senior princes. The attitudes towards economic openness vary among the leading royals: Whereas de facto head of government Crown Prince (now King) Abdallah has generally been seen as a driver of reforms, Minister of Interior Prince Naif has been more careful, often trying to tightly control foreign influences. 9 Even if Naif has not been much involved in the minutiae of daily regulation, Naif's senior status has meant that the Ministry of Interior (MoI) has become largely impermeable for other Saudi agencies. Although it may not have worked actively against WTO accession, its strong and largely autonomous role in economic regulation has made wholesale implementation of new rules more difficult.
Officially, the Ministry of Commerce (MoC) The set-up leaves a lot of space for inter-agency rivalries and incompatible policies.
This has created all the more stumbling blocks as US and EU applied a very broad understanding of WTO membership requirements in the negotiations, touching the responsibilities of numerous agencies. 12 Issues included not only trade rules, but also administrative procedures in general, investment regulations and the legal environment (Wilson, 2004: 91f.; Ramady/Mansour, 2006: 192) . 9 For some of Naif's statements cf. Arab News, 25-4-2000. 10 Interview with senior Saudi government consultant, June 2004. 11 Some 11.000 Saudi studied in the US towards the end of the 1970s; MEED, 14-12-1979, p. 51. 12 The bilateral element in the WTO accession process generally leaves a lot of space for political interests, as the insiders are in a strong bargaining position (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001 : 66f).
Other agencies were often unaware of WTO requirements, 13 and Faqih complained that he did not have the full authority for negotiations. 14 When issues like foreign investment regulation, taxation, subsidies or product standards were deliberated in the course of general reform debates in the late 1990s and early 2000s, WTO criteria were often not taken on board.
WTO issues were often perceived as a 'Ministry of Commerce problem' within the administration. 15 Inter-agency coordinative committees existed (SAMA, 2003: 47) , but patently did not fulfill their function.
Capacity problems and mid-level bureaucratic resilience
The MoC itself, a far less powerful player than MoI or Ministry of Finance, has suffered from its own capacity constraints, typical of the Saudi rentier bureaucracy in general, in which adjustment capacity is low and small-scale resistance to change can be strong. Bank, 2002; SAGIA, 2003) .
Domestic Saudi interests: private sector
Despite its relatively liberal trade policy tradition, the Saudi government appeared structurally unprepared for WTO adaptation. Looking at the Saudi private sector, at first glance the picture appears much more encouraging: many of the large Saudi business groups are among the most impressive in the Gulf and the Middle East region in general, not only in terms of size, but also relative managerial sophistication (Luciani, 2005a (Luciani, , 2005b Instead, a general, diffuse fear was spread across parts of the private sector that large multinational enterprises might steamroll over local business (Malik, 1999: 259ff.; Ramady, 2005: 316) . 33 Some businessmen like Saleh Al-Kamel dressed their concern that economic globalization is a potential danger in "moral" and Islamic language. based models would make us expect, it seems that skepticism was more pronounced than protrade sentiment. More important, business players did not act as lobbying group either way.
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Neither did sub-groups of business engage in systematic lobbying, indicating that the private sector's fragmentation approximated atomization, and therefore was deeper than that of the state, where at least agency-based interests existed.
Quality of information and debate
The most striking feature of the on-and-off debate about WTO membership in Saudi At least the latter statements were part of the 'spectacular amount of disinformation about the WTO' 43 . Rumors spread that the WTO would force the total opening of Saudi borders, free access to the holy sites for non-believers and the replacement of religious Zakat by income tax. 44 The American assurance that such cultural exceptions to free trade would be tolerated did not stop the stories from circulating.
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The scare stories appear all the odder considering that the actual danger to the Saudi private sector from the WTO, although hard to gauge in detail, is moderate at most (SAMBA, 2006 East countries, WTO membership (although admittedly acquired more easily) has not changed very much about business practices. Most Gulf markets are not easy to access without local partners, which means that the latter will not disappear from the scene very easily.
The lack of substantial debate about the WTO somewhat resembles the administration's lack of readiness, and also seems to have institutional reasons, including the non-provision of information by government and the absence of independent research capacity in business associations (cf. Schneider/Maxfield, 1997) . Saudi business, as we will see, can act as ad hoc veto player, but less so as integrated policy-maker. Despite managerial maturity, it still lacks independent, coherently organized policy expertise.
There seems to have been a vicious cycle of absent information on the one hand and lack of clear group formation on the other. Historically, most business players in Saudi Arabia have tended to pursue their interests individually through personal links to princes and bureaucrats, apart from specific junctures where collective distributional interests were clearly at stake, such as taxes, budget cuts, and cuts in foreign manpower (Chaudhry, 1997; Hertog, 2005) . On more complex issues, it has acted as policy-taker towards the traditionally paternalistic state.
Individual sophistication in the private sector seemed much ahead of its collective maturity as interest group. Affirming an engrained pattern, this left the bureaucracy to deal with policy specifics. Indeed, the most systematic defenders of sectoral interests seem to have been the more efficient parts of the state: Central Bank SAMA defending privileges of domestic banks versus other agencies, and SABIC -as highly export-dependent company (Milner/Busch, 2004: 268f.) -pushing for WTO accession in order to gain secure access to petrochemicals markets. 46 Traditional islands of technocratic efficiency, they had the clearest policy positions based on objective interests.
Deficient public-private interaction
Fragmentation was also the dominant theme in the interaction of government and business on WTO issues. It was not the absence of talk about WTO issues as such which prevented the communication of policy interests -indeed, the topic was debated repeatedly in the chambers, Just as important, the government seemed unwilling to engage in meaningful dialogue:
Discussions were non-committal, ad hoc and limited to small audiences, and there was no firm institutional framework which could have given them any binding character. Most of the substantive content of the membership negotiations was kept secret due to fear of backlashes through the media and business interest groups. 51 The actual gains of WTO membership were little advertised. 52 The absence of clear decision-making structures and responsibilities in and around the government served to underline the insignificance of public-private consultations with the MoC and undermine its role as interlocutor. Trust between state and business and scope for credible agreements were limited.
An absent public
Whereas the private sector was part of a somewhat dysfunctional debate, it appears that the rest of the Saudi public had no debate at all. The lack of public education by the government has been criticized in the press, 53 but the press itself did little to flesh out tangible issues of concern to Saudi citizens. The Majlis Ash-Shura, an appointed quasi-parliament which is supposed to represent public interests, was little more than a passive recipient of the government agencies' WTO policies. 54 This is in remarkable contrast to the public interest which free trade issues have generated in other Middle Eastern and developing countries. There was no reaction from Saudi consumers, neither in favor of liberalization (as predicted by Grossman/Helpman, 1994 ) nor according to their respective shares in the factor endowment (as Mayer (1984) argues). Similarly, no labor interests were articulated.
The main reason for absent societal demands is that potentially concerned interests have simply not been organized in Saudi Arabia. Whereas business has been allowed to organize in a corporatist framework, the Saudi distributional system has co-opted and fragmented all other socio-economic interests (Chaudhry, 1997) . Independent interest groups have historically been suppressed. Labor in particular is kept out of politics through the largescale importation of guest workers, who enjoy no political representation and whose presence leads to a segmentation of the labor market between Saudis and expatriates. Recent regimeled attempts to create formal "interest groups" have been anemic and found little resonance in Saudi society (for details cf. Hertog, 2006a) .
Chronology of WTO negotiations: crucial junctures and external conditionality
The account so far has been largely static, reflecting the domestic political economy of the WTO accession process. As we will see, however, there have been rather rapid and significant changes on the level of legislation since 2003. To understand these, a chronological overview of negotiations is necessary, with a special focus on the international dimension of the accession attempt as many changes have in the final analysis been driven by US pressure.
Negotiations until 2003 under Usama Faqih
In early 1997, less than a year after negotiations had started, the hope was to gain admission before the end of the year. 55 Negotiations turned out to be more complex than the Saudi side had initially thought, however, not least due to the breadth of issues broached, including services and intellectual property rights. 56 Saudi market access offers drew criticism from the US and other countries. The proposed binding tariff rates were seen as too high, often far above actually applied levels, and important service areas were missing from the offer. (Ramady, 2005: 318) , 72 based on a decision in the Supreme Economic Council chaired by Crown Prince Abdallah. Although the move seems to have been more immediately related to the envisaged GCC customs union, 73 it was expected that the move would help with the WTO portfolio (Wilson, 2004: 32 81 9/11 might have contributed to the general sense that reforms are needed in the kingdom, but as the actual decision to push the WTO negotiations came one and a half years later, a direct link is difficult to establish. Moreover, in Saudi Arabia strategic decisions tend to be rather compartmentalized -social, economic and political reforms proceed at different paces and often reacting to different pressures. 82 Examples of sudden activism include the above-mentioned tariff reductions, Abdallah's rejection of a "negative list" of sectors barred for FDI in summer 2000, the privatization of Saudi Telecom, and the 2005 announcement of new "economic cities".
The royals had, in principle, been for WTO membership all the way long, but had, as is customary, left considerable scope for the commoner cabinet and bureaucracy to flesh out the details. Now, by way of royal fiat, international demands were rather directly translated into change on the ground, leaving much less scope for inter-agency politics.
The sudden adaptation proceeded in two main steps: first, the kingdom signed its bilateral WTO accession agreement with the EU in July 2003, making substantial concessions on FDI liberalization in services, which had emerged as the biggest issue in the negotiations due to the great potential of finance and telecommunications for foreign investors. 83 This encroached on the turf of line agencies such as SAMA and the telecoms regulator. It appears clear that such steps were only possible thanks to high-level royal backing, in turn induced by the persistence of international demands. The changes cut more deeply than previous domestically negotiated reforms. In the same month, Yamani traveled to Washington to sign a bilateral trade and investment agreement, 84 which served as prelude to the second step: the bilateral agreement with the US. The latter would turn out to be even tougher and widerranging than anticipated, 85 deepening the Saudi feeling that the goalposts were moving (Wilson, 2004: 91f.) . US demands were wide-ranging, including issues of general legal and bureaucratic transparency, intellectual property rights and further service liberalization. The legal changes involved a plethora of agencies. Although several of them have run into customary implementation problems, the reform drive was given unprecedented width by the fact that persistent international demands were so comprehensive. 90 As they were directly translated into policy through the basic acceptance of the WTO deal by the royal leadership, interagency politics now mattered much less. Indeed, the fragmentation of the bureaucracy meant that there was little scope for broader resistance during and after the late phase of negotiations. Bureaucratic veto players who may have procrastinated on individual technicalities had received a clear signal from the top that the externally imposed -and externally judged -package would have to be accepted in its totality.
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Similarly, there appears to have been little organized business protest against any of the measures. As it was clear that a royal decision to move ahead had been made and WTO membership was seen as inevitable, business remained largely silent on most of its implications. There were some cautiously positive post hoc comments from business after accession had eventually happened -as tends to occur in the kingdom once a decision has (Hertog, 2005) , the leadership, even if initially throwing its weight behind a new policy, would have been reluctant to overcome resistances along the road, however local. In this sense, the royal elite was, despite all its centralized power, an intervening variable transmitting a set of external demands.
No matter how upset Saudis are about the squeezing their old American allies have given them, many freely concede that the WTO process has helped to accelerate a number of reforms within the kingdom. 95 Deputy Minister Alamy himself has explained that WTO membership will speed up privatization (not per se a WTO issue) and lock in reforms.
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Leading businessmen have stated that the WTO has actually helped the government to push through awkward measures. 97 Indeed, many of the steps taken now had been prevented before through inter-agency cleavages, endless deliberation and lack of business support, notably the opening up of the financial sector and commerce, which had remained on the "negative list"
for foreign investors in the course of the 2000 FDI reform.
92 Arab News, 10-11-2005; 12-11-2005. 93 Arab News supplement, 17-1-2004, p. 17 With the WTO-induced pressure, translated domestically through a royal decision to move ahead, the liberal technocrats were able to pursue policies which had been languishing in their drawers -and debated in inter-ministerial committees -for many years. Remarkably, some domestic reform measures seem to have been pushed through under the WTO label although they are not strictly linked to the WTO's technical requirements, including reform of the Saudi court system.
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Conclusion
The Saudi bureaucracy has been suffering from a combination of low technical capacity and lack of horizontal coordination. The two together have resulted in deficient information on WTO matters and incapacity of the state to internally coordinate the adaptation to WTO requirements. The isolated structure of administrative "fiefdoms" meant that even reform-minded bureaucrats were subject to systemic institutional constraints and could not develop collective political agency.
The private sector was even more fragmented, with the contrast between individual sophistication and lack of collective capacity being even more striking. At one point at least, leading representatives of the commercial sector managed to veto an ill-managed reform project of the MoC. But the resistance was specific and ad hoc, not representing a stable counter-coalition with a programmatic vision. Our theoretical expectation had actually been that commercial interests should be more diffuse than others. The veto lobbying was based not on broad factor-based interests, however, but on a specific issue which was in parts symbolic.
Arguably more substantive questions of financial liberalization e.g. saw less coherent lobbying.
In toto, the Saudi system was set for policy drift, as it offered no space and no channels for building broader alliances towards either policy change or coordinated resistance. Levels of trust and reciprocity between state and business were low. This was the situation as long as adaptation measures were negotiated mostly domestically.
However, once the Al Saud leadership had realized that external conditionality would only become harsher with time and decided to adopt external demands wholesale, the effects 98 Interview with Western diplomat I, December 2005.
of fragmentation reversed: It was the very lack of coherent collective agency in the Saudi system which made for a swift implementation of the formal-legal aspects of the WTO package. As soon as a top-down decision to go along with an integrated pack of external demands had been taken by the leadership (apparently in early 2003), the fragmented bureaucracy fell in line and acquiesced to measures which had been discussed for many years, but never came to fruition domestically. Business similarly acquiesced, the difference being that there had been less effective resistance in the first place.
Theoretical remarks
It is clear that neither factor-nor sector-based economic models had anything to contribute to the explanation of actual outcomes in the Saudi case. This is despite the rather high maturity of the Saudi economy and a number of clear deductive predictions on domestic interests. The predictions were based on a very rudimentary interpretation of the economic models. But it is not clear how more sophisticated deductive approaches should have added any insights on a process which, as we have seen, has been historically and institutionally determined.
Business, labor and other potential interests failed to coalesce for concrete social and institutional reasons. 99 As far as concrete trade interests were voiced, these had very little to do with abstract attitudes towards the "level of economic integration" that economic theories of trade policy focus on, but with specific sectoral regulations.
The role of institutions in trade policy is still underexplored (Milner, 2002: 458) .
Institutional models tend to be either rather unspecific -focusing on very general variables such as "centralization" or "authoritarianism" -or too much geared on the US system or other developed democracies. It is not my claim that my more ideographic and complex explanation of the Saudi case will yield a general institutional model of trade policy. I doubt the latter is possible. My analysis should however yield a number of testable hypotheses for significant aspects of two-level economic policy-making in a range of cases specifically in the developing world.
Rentier fragmentation
Fragmentation of state and society is a specific historical outcome of Saudi rentier history.
Although not an automatic result of oil income, a number of Middle Eastern rentier countries with weak pre-oil states such as Qatar, the UAE, Libya and Oman appear to have similar institutional structures (or institutional "legacies"; Goldstein, 1988 
Effects of fragmentation
It has been argued that a large numbers of parties -i.e. complex ruling coalitions -make it difficult to change the policy status quo (Haggard/Kaufman, 1995; Tsebelis, 2002) . Moreover, divided government reportedly increases levels of protection and makes liberalization more difficult (O'Halloran, 1994 , O'Halloran/Lohmann, 1994 . Absent direct royal intervention, the fragmented Saudi bureaucracy seems to be the functional equivalent of divided government or a fragmented party system, effectively containing a considerable number of veto players. 101 As we have seen, such fragmentation can indeed make it more difficult to change the status quo, as the leadership draws on the bureaucracy for agenda-setting. If external pressure and an external agenda come into play, however, changing the status quo can actually become considerably easier, as counter-coalitions are less likely to be formed.
The more fragmented the domestic setting, the easier it should be for negotiators to use the two-level negotiation game to impose an otherwise unfeasible policy package (Evans et al., 1993) .
102 100 Once could say that through their state-and clientele-building strategies, regimes have manipulated the structure of interest representation (Nelson, 1988) , but on a larger historical scale than envisaged in institutional theories. 101 Liberalization supposedly is the most successful where trade policy is delegated to insulated bureaucratic bodies (Haggard/Webb, 1994) . This is patently not the case if there are other bureaucratic veto players. 102 The existing debate on two-level games has mostly focused on the full-scale interplay of domestic and international negotiations (Putnam, 1988; Mayer, 1992; Evans et al., 1993) . The issue here rather is how exogenous international intervention impacts existing domestic reform negotiations. Putnam has speculated in passing that a "chief negotiator" can use international negotiations to impose domestic policies that would otherwise be unfeasible, but this is not the main focus of the discussion and conditions for this are not analyzed (Putnam, 1988: 457) . The comparative insight that if coalitions for change are difficult to organize in a purely domestic context, this will also make veto coalitions less likely and therefore externally imposed change easier to Fragmentation does not only have an impact on coalitional logic, but also on interestformation itself. In the Saudi case, most players had few clear interests beyond their defensive reflexes, not least due to the absence or fragmentation of information: The impact of institutional fragmentation on collective interest formation is exacerbated by the costs of acquiring and disseminating information (which are generally high on complex policy matters such as trade; Baldwin, 1985: 9) . In the Saudi case a fragmented institutional environment did not only determine the (non-)aggregation of preferences, but also left preferences themselves in a diffuse and ill-informed state, notably in the case of Saudi business with its lack of collective policy-making capacities (Thelen, 1999: 374-377; Milner, 2002: 455) . As institutional deficits result in weakness or absence of clearly formulated, rationally derived interests, 103 they leave more scope for "subjective" interests (as in the case of the trade agencies and the generalized unease of business) and, possibly, politics of identity (as in the case of businessman Saleh Kamel's Islamic moralizing).
The problem for Saudi business was not so much that it could not organize the representation of views which in general were clear. It was rather the very lack of an institutional field in which clear views could have been created in the first place through sound information and encompassing debate. Business was internally fragmented, or even atomized on a micro-level. This fragmentation was sustained not least by the fact that it operated in a generally disjointed system that provided few incentives for collective action, as secrecy and meso-level fragmentation of the state did not make the latter a credible negotiation partner. There was no scope for a policy-oriented state-business coalition, as both parties lacked coherence.
Fragmentation and level of institutional and coalitional coherence are useful explanatory factors for policy-making capacity and policy outcomes across different political systems. In the context of state-business relations, the capacities of organized business as well as trust and reciprocity between state and business need to be assessed to determine the capacities of interest-formation, policy coordination and coalition-building (Schneider/Maxfield, 1997) . Depending on whether external pressure is applied or not, the coherence of state-business networks can have very different consequences, both preventing cohesive reform coalitions, and preventing veto coalitions against reform. More generally, the state-business literature, not yet linked to IPE, can help to move trade policy analysis beyond push through is new. In this argument, the policy "win-sets" of two-level games analysis are less important than the more fundamental capacity to formulate and coordinate different interests. 103 Better availability of information arguably empowers protectionist groups (Goldstein and Martin, 2000) . In this sense, Saudi Arabia's liberalizing technocrats have been very lucky.
"conventional" political institutions, which often do not exist or are not relevant in developing countries.
Shifting roles of leaders
The Saudi leadership has played an ambiguous role in this context, which shows that "high"
or "low" centralization are not always unambiguously detectable, as the literature might make us expect. On the one hand, Saudi ministries in fact had to negotiate among themselves for a long period, indicating low de facto centralization of policy-making and the ruling elite's high dependence on technocratic expertise (Nelson, 1988: 825f.) . On the other hand, the top-down implementation of the external policy package through the royal family indicated a very high level of centralization. Similarly, the hypothesis that trade liberalization is more successful under authoritarian rule (Haggard/Webb, 1994) does not apply in any straightforward way to the fragmented Saudi case. Institutional fragmentation might be a more useful (and more universal) explanatory variable. The model adumbrated here calls for further systematic research on the comparative dynamics of domestically versus internationally negotiated reforms.
